

FROM GAS CRISES TO WAR WITH RUSSIA FEDERATION. THE ROLE OF UKRAINE IN ENSURING ENERGY SECURITY OF POLAND AND CENTRAL EUROPE COUNTRIES

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ABSTRACT

Central Europe has been a key arena for the Law and Justice party foreign policy activity, driven by the belief that Poland's strong position in the region could enhance its ability to influence decisions within the European Union. At the same time, the expectation was to increase the subjectivity of Poland and the countries of the region. Polish energy security activities carried out over the years (infrastructure development, diversification strategy) were based on the conviction of the possible negative consequences of market monopolization by the Russian Federation. In this regard, the need for projects that can strengthen security was emphasized, and cooperation with Central European countries and Ukraine also played an important role. Therefore, the country could play an extremely important role in the region's energy independence efforts. It was therefore recognized that the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines could weaken not only Ukraine, but also other Central European countries. The cognitive aim of the article was to analyze the political thought of Law and Justice towards the importance of Ukraine for ensuring energy security of Poland and Central European countries. The starting point for consideration was the thesis that Law and Justice treated Ukraine as a key partner in efforts to reduce the importance of the Russian Federation in the region, an area that was central to the party's foreign policy.

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Introduction

Central Europe has been a key arena for the Law and Justice party's foreign policy efforts. In this context, one of the most important elements for the representatives of this political party was the desire to strengthen the energy independence of the countries of the region vis-à-vis the Russian Federation, which, in the opinion of the Law and Justice party, used energy resources for its foreign policy. For this reason, Ukraine, a country that has played an important role over the years in transporting crude oil and natural gas from Russia to Central and Western European countries, has played an extremely important role in these activities.

Over the years, the Russian Federation has taken various measures to reduce Ukraine's importance in Europe, and one of the most important tools has been energy resources. In the past, the natural gas crises that have occurred have been arbitrarily used by the Russian Federation to advance its foreign policy goals, which have ranged from minimizing the country's importance in ensuring the energy security of Central European countries to «bypassing» Ukraine by implementing energy projects to that end (the construction of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines). For Law and Justice, the Russian-German energy project was not businesslike in nature and its purpose was political. Undoubtedly, Law and Justice's assessment of the international environment ultimately proved accurate, as it was the party that repeatedly raised on the Polish and international political scene that the construction of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines would weaken Ukraine and lead to war.

The full-scale attack by the Russian Federation on Ukraine in February 2022 significantly changed the geopolitical situation in Central Europe in various dimensions, including energy. Law and Justice has for years advocated measures to strengthen the energy security of countries in the region through the development of energy infrastructure, which is also served by Polish projects (including the construction of an LNG terminal in Swinoujscie, the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, Poland-Lithuania and Poland-Slovakia interconnectors). For Law and Justice politicians, Ukraine undoubtedly played an extremely important role in efforts to strengthen the energy independence of Central European countries, which is why they negatively assessed the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. In this regard, they fully supported Ukraine's position.

The cognitive aim of the article was to analyze the political thought¹ of Law and Justice towards the importance of Ukraine for ensuring energy security of Poland and Central European countries². In this context, it was crucial to answer three research questions: 1) how Law and Justice politicians assessed the level of energy security of Central European countries during this period; 2) what role Ukraine

¹ Political thought should be understood as «any form of reflection on political reality, regardless of the degree of development, internal coherence and systematization, as well as theoreticalization and concretization» (Jachymek, Paruch, 2001).

² Analysis of political projects to ensure the country's energy security is the subject of a study of the political thought of political parties (Paszowski, 2015).

played in the assessment of Law and Justice's efforts to reduce the importance of the Russian Federation in the region; 3) how Law and Justice politicians assessed energy projects underway in Poland that could lead to increased energy security for Central European countries and support Ukraine in its quest for energy independence. The considerations in the article reveal the main arguments formulated by the politicians of this political party on the need and legitimacy of increasing the energy security of Central European countries and the role and position of Ukraine in this regard. The starting point of the analysis was the thesis that Law and Justice treated Ukraine as a key partner in efforts to reduce the importance of the Russian Federation in the Central European region, an area central to the party's foreign policy.

The importance of Ukraine on the energy map of Europe

For years, Ukraine has played an extremely important role in foreign policy and regional cooperation efforts (Sokół, 2022) and the idea of strengthening the energy security of Central European countries. For many years, the Law and Justice party has treated cooperation with the country as an important aspect of its efforts to reduce the influence of the Russian Federation in the region. That's why Law and Justice advocated an «open door» policy for Ukraine's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Sanecka-Tyczyńska, 2011; Wicha, 2012). In this context, the role of Ukraine on the energy map of Europe, as a transit country for crude oil and natural gas supplies, was also emphasized. Also, in the context of Poland's energy security, the country has played an important indirect role, which can be strengthened depending on joint projects.

Ukraine, according to the Law and Justice party, had several important functions for Poland, both political, economic and military. In the energy dimension, the country has played a different role in ensuring the energy security of Poland (indirect) and Central European countries (direct). This importance was due to the lack of energy connections, although in the past Ukraine was considered an important energy partner in the construction of the Brody-Plock pipeline, i.e. an extension of the Odessa-Brody pipeline established in 2002 to enable the supply of crude oil available in the Black Sea (mainly from the Caspian region) to Central European countries, primarily Poland. The concept of building a pipeline emerged in 1996 to diversify the sources and directions of crude oil supplies (Paszkowski, 2011). In this regard, there has been dialogue between energy exporting countries at the political level (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan), transit countries (Georgia, Ukraine) and potential importers (Poland, Lithuania). This idea was implemented by Lech Kaczyński, President of the Republic of Poland in 2005-2010 in the framework of «energy summits» organized in Krakow (11-12.V.2007), Vilnius (10-11.X.2007), Kiev (23.V.2008) and Baku (13-14.XI.2008). Under these conditions, the concept introduced was aimed at increasing the energy independence of Central European countries from the Russian Federation and increasing the availability of crude oil from other directions (Wicha, 2021; Żurawski vel Grajewski, 2016).

The preparation of the Brody-Adamovo pipeline project was the responsibility of MPR «Sarmatia», whose shareholders include state companies from Poland (PERN),

Ukraine (Ukrtransnafta), Georgia (Georgia Oil and Gas Corporation), Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and the Republic of Lithuania (Klaipėdos nafta – now KN Energies). This project envisaged the construction of a 397 km pipeline (271 km on Polish territory and 126 km on Ukrainian territory) with a capacity of 10 million tonnes per year (Niewiadomski, 2022). Ongoing work on the construction of a pipeline connection linking the Polish and Ukrainian crude oil systems ultimately failed to materialize. Several issues have contributed to this. First, the lack of profitability of the investment, due to the limited availability of crude oil (Azerbaijan maximizes exports through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline) and the low interest of domestic refineries in crude oil from the region (Plock, Gdansk). Second, the cost of implementation of the investment and the source of funds necessary for the construction of the pipeline, especially since the owner of MPR's «Sarmatia» is the company responsible for transporting and storing crude oil, not processing it (excluding SOCAR). Thus, the lack of interest in buying crude oil and the guarantee of its purchase by refineries in Poland undermined the economic sense of this investment.

The war in Ukraine and the country's expected economic recovery will also require increased demand for liquid fuels in the country. In this context, a debate has taken place in Poland on the possibility of building a pipeline and securing crude oil supplies in an alternative direction to the original one. However, the legitimacy of building the pipeline and securing crude oil supplies to Ukraine is currently questionable for several reasons. *Primo*, Ukraine's refining industry is in a catastrophic situation, and the destruction of the Krzemenchuk refinery as a result of the war means that there are currently no functioning plants that could be supplied by the new pipeline. This will require the construction of new refineries, as well as the expansion of the national pipeline network. *Secundo*, the cost of upgrading or building new refineries will be extremely high. At present, it is difficult to indicate the size of the refinery construction, especially since it is not known, among other things, what the demand for liquid fuels in Ukraine will be, and thus how much refining capacity will be needed. In addition, it should be taken into account that the construction of refineries in a region at war will be higher due to the potential insurance of such transactions. *Tertio*, there are refineries in the region capable of supplying the Ukrainian market with liquid fuels. The situation is not expected to change even after the war ends. At the same time, the process of closing less innovative plants in Europe will continue in line with the energy transition and thus the development of the market for electric cars. *Quarto*, in the situation of the decision to provide crude oil supplies to Ukraine through Poland, and thus the crude oil terminal in Gdansk, it would also be necessary to build a second line of the Pomeranian pipeline. Under current conditions (EU sanctions against Russia and cancellation of crude oil supplies from that direction), the capacity of this pipeline is already insufficient for refineries in Germany (Schwedt, Spergau). If exports to Ukraine increase, the capacity of this pipeline would have to be increased (Zespół ThinkTank Trójmorze, 2022).

With regard to natural gas, the existing Polish-Ukrainian interconnection allowed limited supplies of this commodity from Ukraine to Poland and in the opposite

direction. The decline in the importance and role of Ukraine on the energy map of Europe, along with the construction of the Nord Stream 1, Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines, has meant a reduction in the transit of natural gas through its territory. In this context, Ukraine's underground natural gas storage facilities (the largest in Europe) have also lost their importance (Paszkowski, 2023). Under these new conditions, Polish companies have been keeping natural gas in storage facilities in Ukraine, which were used mainly in the autumn and winter, a time of increased demand for this commodity.

However, in addition to Ukraine's limited importance to Poland, which focuses solely on maintaining natural gas reserves, the country plays an important role in the region. For many years, Ukraine has played a valuable role in the context of natural gas supply. Thus, the country has guaranteed the energy security of Central European countries. At the same time, such a position has strengthened the country's role in the region. The lack of transit, which may occur from 2025, will be fundamental to the new architecture of energy security in Central Europe (Tani, Sheppard, 2023). In this new environment, Ukraine will have to rely on domestic natural gas production and natural gas connections with countries in the region. As a result, the number of interconnections between countries can be expected to increase, as well as countries that already have access to regasification terminals (e.g., Poland).

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the importance of Ukraine for Poland's energy security over the years has been limited. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to implement joint energy projects (construction of the Brody-Plock pipeline) that could strengthen political-energy relations between the two countries. However, under the new changed circumstances, the prospects for the pipeline are questionable due to the weakness of the refining sector in Ukraine. In the context of natural gas cooperation, Poland uses existing underground natural gas storage facilities in Ukraine, which play an important role during the autumn and winter. However, the chances for further development of energy cooperation are limited, as the most important issue is political stability, which can be ensured only after the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war. According to Law and Justice, Ukraine played a key role in ensuring the energy security of Central European countries.

Against «bypassing» Ukraine

Over the years, Law and Justice's approach to Ukraine's political independence has been unchanged. In doing so, it recognized that the country should shape its energy policy in a sovereign manner. In this context, all kinds of natural gas crises in the past, which, according to the Law and Justice party, were inspired by the Russian Federation, which used such situations to undermine Ukraine's role as a transit state, were negatively assessed. For this reason, Law and Justice politicians stressed that joint Russian-German energy projects could eventually lead to armed conflict in Europe (Wiech, 2023).

Earlier energy crises, which led to the suspension of natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation to Europe on several occasions (2006, 2009), have revived

political debate about the importance of the country as a supplier of energy resources. Undoubtedly, the natural gas conflicts of 2006 and 2009 negatively affected the international community's perception of Ukraine as a transit country. This point of view was also inspired by the Russian Federation. The interruption of natural gas supplies to Central and Western Europe has been one of the elements of the discussions on the construction of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline (formerly the Northern Gas Pipeline). The implementation of this type of investment, which was finally launched in August 2006, was negatively assessed by Law and Justice politicians. The position adopted at the time emphasized the lack of a business case for Russian-German investment. A similar point of view was raised by politicians of this political formation when the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline began. The investment, initiated in 2011, was contrary to the Polish *raison d'état*, since, like the earlier project, it was political rather than economic in nature. According to the Law and Justice party, the two projects posed a threat to the energy security of Poland and Central European countries, so three charges were brought against them in this context (Paszkowski, 2023). First, the implementation of the investment has hindered the diversification of sources and directions of natural gas supply to Central European countries. In this context, it was feared that the Russian Federation would monopolize the natural gas market in Europe. It also noted the negative impact of the project on other energy projects and the possibility of importing natural gas from other directions. In fact, it was recognized that the price and solutions offered by Russia could hinder active infrastructure development efforts, given that natural gas availability was assured from the east. As a result, for many years import capacity in Central Europe was not expanded, but only natural gas connections were built between countries. Some exceptions to this rule were the construction of an LNG terminal in Lithuania's Klaipeda (2014), an LNG terminal in Poland's Swinoujscie (2015) and the Baltic Pipe pipeline, which allows natural gas supplies from Norway to Poland (2022). It was only with the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022 that the construction of LNG terminals in Europe progressed and infrastructure was developed to enable the abandonment of natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation.

Second, argued the negative impact on the implementation of the common energy policy, including ensuring energy solidarity of Central European countries towards Ukraine. It was clear to Law and Justice that the construction of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines, as well as TurkStream, would technically «bypass» Ukraine in terms of natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation to Europe. It was recognized that a project in this area could significantly lower the country's position on the energy map of Europe (Warzecha, 2021). At the same time, it was pointed out that Ukraine's declining role could ultimately lead to war on the continent. The views formulated stemmed from a belief in the Russian Federation's superpower policy and its attempt to rebuild its influence in Central Europe, with energy resources as a key tool in this regard. In this way, Russia applied the Falin-Kvitinsky doctrine (Mróz, Paszkowski, 2023). According to Law and Justice, the establishment of

Russian-German gas pipelines thus undermined the principle of energy solidarity in Europe, as the process of becoming dependent on natural gas supplies from Russia progressed under such conditions, while at the same time decisions in this regard were made arbitrarily by the governments in Moscow and Berlin. In a particular way, these pipelines have undermined the sense of energy cooperation in Europe, as they have come under attack from many EU member states. At the same time, realizing the purpose of the Nord Stream 1, Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines, Law and Justice politicians stressed the negative consequences for EU-Ukraine cooperation.

Third, the reduced importance of Ukraine as a transit country. The expansion of import capacity and the simultaneous monopolization of the European energy market by the Russian Federation have significantly undermined the sense of transporting natural gas through Ukrainian territory. Law and Justice politicians stressed that it is in Ukraine's vital interest to maintain its status as a transit state to fulfill at least two tasks. *Primo*, to provide the financial resources necessary both to keep Ukraine's energy infrastructure in proper working and to generate revenue for the state budget. *Secundo*, continue to play an important energy role in Europe, which had direct implications for both political and military positions on the continent. In this context, it was believed that Ukraine could once again fall into the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation, especially since its low importance on the energy map of Europe could, as predicted by the Law and Justice party, lead to war (Kowalski, 2021).

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that Law and Justice politicians realistically assessed the energy situation in Europe. The views of the party's members stemmed from a belief in the Russian Federation's expansive foreign policy and the use of energy resources to achieve political goals. In this context, they pointed out that an energy-independent Ukraine, which would play an appropriate role on the European continent in the transit of energy resources, is an important link in the energy security of Central European countries. Law and Justice politicians stressed the negative impact of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines in particular on the European security architecture. Undoubtedly, they were fully convinced that the construction of these pipelines would lead to the marginalization of Ukraine in Europe, and thus the country's importance to other countries on the continent, and ultimately lead to war.

Supporting energy independence for Central Europe

For Law and Justice, treating the Central European region as a key area of political activity meant that domestic energy projects were intended not only to serve Poland, but also to strengthen the independence of the countries in the area. To a large extent, such issues became even more relevant when the Russian-Ukrainian war broke out in February 2022. It was of utmost importance to Law and Justice that the completed energy projects, which were originally intended to strengthen Poland's energy security, could ultimately also have a positive impact on energy independence from the Russian Federation. In this context, it also advocated the construction of

an energy hub to serve not only Poland, but also other Central European countries, including Ukraine.

For many years, Poland has advocated energy independence for Central European countries and believed that infrastructure development would be an important aspect. Undoubtedly, for years, in the opinion of the Law and Justice party, there was a «chess game» going on in Europe, whose participants were the Russian Federation on the one hand, and the Central European states on the other. As Piotr Naimski, Government Plenipotentiary for Strategic Energy Infrastructure pointed out, «they [Russia – M.P.] are trying to close the region [in terms of natural gas supplies – M.P.], and we are trying to escape from it» (YouTube, 2018). As part of the ongoing rivalry, the field of «battle» was the natural gas market, due to its direct importance for energy security. At the same time, this commodity was crucial to the functioning of both industry and the economy more broadly, as well as to citizens (used in thermal generation). It was therefore a sector that was particularly subject to politicization, and one of its elements, characteristic of the Russian Federation's relations with Central European countries, was the conclusion of political agreements in addition to trade agreements. Therefore, unlike in Western European countries, this was an area of activity that also required the participation of the political factor.

Undoubtedly, the importance of the natural gas sector to the security of the country was undeniable, which necessitated the need to adequately counter emerging threats. In Central European countries, the Russian Federation's foreign policy, which has not actually led to the development of import capabilities, has been evaluated in different ways over the years. Therefore, it is primarily the country's goods that have guaranteed the functioning of the economies of the various countries over the years. Even the natural gas crises of 2006 and 2009 did not revise the approach to cooperation with Russia in many countries, and in some cases even tightened it.

The politicization of a key sector of the economy has led Central European countries to approach cooperation with the Russian Federation in different ways. There is no doubt that Poland has been taking active steps over the years to diversify the sources and directions of natural gas supplies, and this goal has been pursued through a number of investments. First, the regasification terminal in Swinoujście, which has made Poland one of the countries with a global influence on the natural gas market. Second, the construction of the Baltic Pipe pipeline, which allowed direct access to natural gas produced in Norway. Third, the development of transmission infrastructure on the north-south axis, including in particular the construction of an interconnector linking Poland with Lithuania (GIPL) and Poland with Slovakia. Thanks to the implementation of these investments, it was possible to import natural gas to Poland via the regasification terminal in Klaipėda, Lithuania, and from southern Europe via Slovakia (e.g., access to LNG terminals in Greece and natural gas exported by Azerbaijan to Central Europe via the TANAP/TAP pipelines, based on expanded gas connections in the Balkans). At the same time, the infrastructure created also made it possible to ensure natural gas supplies from Poland to Central European countries, i.e. north to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and through the Balticconnector

to Finland, as well as south to Slovakia and other countries in the region (Furman, 2022).

A key aspect, promoted by Law and Justice, of Poland playing a greater role in Central Europe was the development of import and transmission capacity, mainly to the south of the continent. Infrastructure development was particularly affected by the Russian-Ukrainian war. The full-scale attack by the Russian Federation on Ukraine has prompted Central European countries to take active steps to limit Russia's influence on political decisions since February 2022. An important aspect in this regard was the process of energy independence. Therefore, Poland, while continuing work on the construction of a regasification terminal of the FSRU type in Gdansk, considered two solutions. *Primo*, the construction of one larger unit with the capacity to supply about 12 bcm per year. *Secundo*, construction of two smaller units with a total import capacity of 10.6 bcm per year (the first, larger unit with a regasification capacity of 6.1 bcm and the second, smaller unit with an import capacity of 4.5 bcm) (Energetyka24.pl, 2023).

Essentially, the construction of FSRU-type regasification terminals was to allow Poland to play a significant role on the energy map of Europe. Thus, the Law and Justice government's goal was to create a gas hub that would allow Poland's LNG terminals (mainly a smaller one with import capacity, which was to be built in 2027) to be used to export natural gas to Central European countries (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, 2023). In this context, it was pointed out that the construction of such infrastructure would enable the implementation of at least three tasks of a strategic nature. First, the «derusification» of natural gas supplies to the countries of the region, that is, ensuring access to this resource from other directions than the Russian Federation. Thus, under the new conditions, energy security would be based not on supplies from the east, but from Poland. Second, the energy integration of the countries of the region and the growth of Poland's role on the energy map of Europe. In this context, the possibility of strengthening regional cooperation and building a bloc of countries independent of the Russian Federation in terms of energy has emerged. Thirdly, to strengthen the energy independence of the countries in the region, including ensuring that they can act as an important link in the supply of natural gas to Ukraine. In an important way, the LNG terminal was to play a vital role in strengthening the import capacity of Ukraine, under attack from Russia. In the end, however, this demand was not fully realized, as no companies appeared that would be interested in importing natural gas through Poland. Importantly, Czechia played a key role, reserving import capacity for a planned LNG terminal in Germany³. An important argument in favor of abandoning the investment was the need, raised by Poland, to expand the Poland-Czechia interconnection (Stork II

³ On 23 November 2023, energy company ČEZ concluded an agreement with Germany's Hanseatic Energy Hub, reserving for Czechia the use of Stade terminal in Germany. The terminal is currently under construction and the first deliveries of natural gas to Czechia are expected to start in September 2027, amounting to 2 bcm per year (Czarnecki, Marzec, 2023).

project with a capacity of about 5 bcm per year) (Babak, Jabłoński, 2023). Thanks to the cooperation with Germany, Czechia did not have to increase its import capacity, as the already existing infrastructure connecting the Czechia with Germany could be used to supply natural gas from the LNG terminal in Stade.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that after February 2022. Poland has played an extremely important role in regional cooperation and has shown that the energy projects under way (the Swinoujscie LNG terminal, the Baltic Pipe pipeline, interconnections with Lithuania and Slovakia) can serve regional energy security. The next step in regional integration was to be an FSRU-type LNG terminal in Gdansk. Ultimately, however, this investment did not materialize, due to a lack of interest in Poland's ability to import natural gas (mainly due to a decision by the Czech government). At the same time, the development of infrastructure was, in the opinion of the Law and Justice party, also crucial in the context of the possibility of supplying Ukraine with this commodity, given the actions of the European Union countries towards the realization of supplies from the Russian Federation. Thus, it was assessed that not only Ukraine could play an important role in ensuring Poland's security, but also vice versa, especially since the Russian-Ukrainian agreement on natural gas transit through Ukrainian territory was set to expire at the end of 2024.

Conclusion

The role of Ukraine in the context of Poland's ability to ensure energy security has changed more systematically over the years as a result of the changing international environment. Undoubtedly, despite the lack of infrastructure connections (only to some extent natural gas and electricity) for Poland, a country like Ukraine had a much bigger role to play in the region than just securing natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation. The importance of Ukraine in the Law and Justice party's concepts was more broadly due to the country's role in guaranteeing the energy security of Central European countries. It is also in this context that Law and Justice has systematically advocated against the construction of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines, which, along with the TurkStream pipeline, could «bypass» Ukraine, ultimately leading to a Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022. Also in this aspect, it has been repeatedly emphasized that the Russian Federation is systematically making Central European countries dependent on energy resources, building its networks of influence and ultimately applying the Falin-Kvitsky doctrine.

For the Law and Justice party, the awareness of the importance of Ukraine for the energy security of Poland and Central Europe countries more broadly stemmed from the negative perception of the Russian Federation and the foreign policy pursued by that country. Accordingly, he advocated measures to strengthen regional energy security. With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Law and Justice government has advocated continuing efforts to increase regional import and transport capabilities. Thanks to the construction of the natural gas hub, an opportunity has arisen to secure natural gas supplies not only to Poland, but also to Central European countries and Ukraine. Thus, there would be a significant change, because for many years it was Ukraine, through the construction of the Brody-Plock

pipeline, that was supposed to enhance Poland's energy security, and with Poland's role as a transit country, the role and mutual relations would change.

In summary, it should be pointed out that for Law and Justice over the years Ukraine has played an extremely important role in ensuring Poland's energy security, although this role was primarily indirect. In this context, it has been repeatedly raised what a threat the natural gas crises between the Russian Federation and Ukraine were (2006 and 2009). Law and Justice negatively assessed Russia's actions in the region and its attempt to monopolize markets, forcing the expansion of domestic import capacity. Energy security of Central European countries was also crucial for Poland, so Ukraine played an important role in these activities. The actions taken in 2022 at the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war and Poland's support for Ukraine should also be evaluated in this context.

The opinions expressed in the publication present only the views of the author and cannot be equated with the position of the Institute of Central Europe.

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ВІД ГАЗОВОЇ КРИЗИ ДО ВІЙНИ З РОСІЙСЬКОЮ ФЕДЕРАЦІЄЮ: РОЛЬ УКРАЇНИ В ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННІ ЕНЕРГЕТИЧНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ ПОЛЬЩІ ТА КРАЇН ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЇ ЄВРОПИ

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Анотація

Центральна Європа була ключовою ареною зовнішньополітичної діяльності партії «Право і справедливість», яка ґрунтувалася на переконанні, що сильні позиції Польщі в регіоні можуть посилити її здатність впливати на рішення Європейського Союзу. Водночас очікувалося, що це збільшить суб'єктність Польщі та країн регіону. Польська діяльність у сфері енергетичної безпеки, яку здійснювали протягом багатьох років (розвиток інфраструктури, стратегія диверсифікації), ґрунтувалася на переконанні про можливі негативні наслідки монополізації ринку Російською Федерацією. У зв'язку з цим наголошували на необхідності проєктів, здатних зміцнити безпеку, а також важливу роль відіграла співпраця з країнами Центральної Європи та Україною. Таким чином, країна може відігравати надзвичайно важливу роль у зусиллях регіону щодо енергетичної незалежності. Тому було визнано, що трубопроводи «Північний потік 1» і «Північний потік 2» можуть послабити не лише Україну, а й інші країни Центральної Європи. Пізнавальною метою статті був аналіз політичної думки партії «Право і справедливість» щодо важливості України для забезпечення енергетичної безпеки Польщі та країн Центральної Європи. Відправною точкою для розгляду стала теза про те, що партія «Право і справедливість» розглядала Україну як ключового партнера в зусиллях, спрямованих на зменшення значення Російської Федерації в регіоні, який був центральним у зовнішній політиці партії.

Ключові слова:

Польща, Україна, Центральна Європа, енергетична безпека, російсько-українська війна, політична думка, партія «Право і справедливість».

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